Agenda

- Mission
- Capabilities
- Distribution Overview
- Process Flow
- Organization
- Performance Roll-up
- Issues

MMDC Mission

Provide general support shipping, receiving and consolidated distribution capability and facilitate E2E in-transit visibility for Multi National Force-West (MNF-W) units in order to maintain throughput velocity and sustain operational tempo.

MMDC Capabilities

- **Ground Freight shipping & receiving (AMS-TAC)**
- **Air Freight shipping & receiving (AMS-TAC, GATES)**
- **In-Transit Visibility (BCS3, W2W/LTM, Interrogator Network)**
- **Container Management**
- **Throughput distribution liaison nodes at Dover AFB, Camp Arifjan-Kuwait, AO East FOBs Baharia, and Ar Ramadi, AO West FOBs Al Asad Air Base, Ubaydi, and Korean Village**

Strategic/Operational/Tactical Distribution Process



MMDC Flow Chart

- All inbound air & surface cargo is received and processed at Receiving Section
- All cargo is staged on the RUC Line by Ultimate Consignee & FOB
- MDC provides local delivery aboard TQ & AA
- Dispatch convoys to Ar Ramadi, Baharia, and Al Asad
- Dispatch cargo for Inter & Intra theater via military air and tender express
- Process Personal Effects & High priority cargo (300lbs<) via FedEx & DHL in accordance with WWX Tender



MMDC Flow Chart (Cont)



MMDC Air Shipping & Receiving



1st MLG 31XX
Table of Organization

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 08-2

AFTER ACTION REPORT / LESSONS LEARNED

MDC

1 MO
68 ME

FREIGHT OPS (19 ME)
2 SNCO's
6 NCO's
11 NONNCO's

(9)-3112, (1)-3300, (1)-5711, (2)-3043, (5)-3051

JACOT/ATOC (6 ME)

1 SNCO
1 NCO
4 NONNCO's

(1)-1161, (3)-3112, (1)-3051, (1)-0431

CONTAINER MANAGEMENT (1 ME)

1 NCO

(1)-1161

DLC AL ASAD (26 ME)

4 SNCO's, 9 NCO's
13 NONNCO's

(9)-3112, (4)-3381, (1)-1391, (1)-3043, (1)- 1371, (6)- 3051

PP&P

(4)-3052

OPS SECTION (6 ME)
2 NCO's
1 NONNCO
(3)-3051

PALLET RIDERS
2 NCO
1 NONNCO

(1)-3051, (1)-3381, (1)-0411

DLC BAHARIA (CLB-5)

1 MO, 1 NCO, 6 NONNCO's

(1)-3002, (4)-3043, (1)-3051, (1)-3052, (1)-3381

PP&P (10)
2 SNCO's
3 NCO's
5 NONNCO's

(9)-3052
(1)-3112

DLC AR RAMADI (CLB-5)

1 SNCO, 1 NCO, 3 NONNCO's

(4)-3043, (1)-3051

MDC

This data reflects from 1 Sept 08 to 1 Mar 2009

RUC LINE Inbound

- **BJX/Other Units: 3394 TEU's**
- **SMU: 1820 TEU's**

RUC LINE Outbound

- TQ: 1275 TEU's
- BH: 112 TEU's
- AA: 1261 TEU's
- RA: 618 TEU's
- CF: 384 TEU's
- HB: 61 TEU's

RUC LINE Rolling Stock

- Total Rolling Stock – 410

JACOT Inbound

- **2902 Total 463L Pallets**
- **1521 PT (MMX200)**
- **319 PT (MMX201)**
- **177 PT (MMX160)**
- **885 PT (Other Units)**

JACOT Rolling Stock

- 15 - Rolling Stock

JACOT Outbound

- **2017 Total 463L Pallets**
- **1616 Al Asad**
- **116 Kuwait**
- **12 Norfolk, VA**
- **27 Balad**
- **52 Charleston**
- **68 Kandahar**
- **06 Cherry Point, NC**
- **32 Travis**
- **11 Kadena**
- **63 Camp Bastion**
- **14 OTHER**

MDC OUTBOUND AIR

Data reflects from 15 Dec 08 to 1 Mar 09 for AA

1 Sept 08 to 1 Mar 09 for TQ



SUMMARY

- **Total Containers O/H: 1, 826**
- **Total Gov Owned: 719**
- **Total Gov Pool: 876**
- **Total Leased: 2**
- **Total BOH's 199**
- **Quadcons 10**
- **Tricons 20**

SMU Storage:	MEDLOG:	ASP:
584 Gov Owned	59 Gov Owned	76 Gov Owned
871 Gov Pool	5 Gov Pool	3 QUADCONS
2 Leased	1 TRICON	
199 BOH containers		
19 TRICON containers		
7 QUADCON containers		
Total: 1,683	Total: 65	Total: 79

Det B

This data reflects from 8 Dec 2008 to 1 Mar 2009

AA RUC LINE Inbound

TQX/BJX/Other: 1038 TEU's

- **1009: Al Asad**
- **19: Korean Village**
- **10: Rawah**

AA RUC LINE Outbound

- **970: Al Asad**
- **42: Korean Village**
- **28: Rawah**
- **9: TQ**

AA Ruc Line Rolling Stock

- Total Rolling Stock – **112**

AA JACOT Inbound

535 Total 463L Pallets

- **270 PT TQ**
- **12 PT Kuwait**
- **96 PT Dover**
- **128 PT Mina-Abdullah**
- **6 PT Baghdad**
- **19 PT Ali Al Salem**
- **4 PT Kandahar**

AA JACOT Rolling Stock

- **30** - Rolling Stock

AA JACOT Outbound

- **240 Total 463L Pallets**
- **38 TQ**
- **61 Kuwait**
- **23 Charleston**
- **60 Travis AFB**
- **8 Kandahar**
- **9 Norfolk**
- **5 Hickam AFB**
- **36 OTHER**

DLC

- **Current disposition of AO East DLC does not reflect current Marine Corps Policy. MCO 4470.1 clearly states that the MMDC has the following task: Establish, coordinate, and control Distribution Liaison Cells (DLC).**
- **Debate on if the DLCs should belong to the SMU's MMDC or the Direct Support Combat Logistics Battalions - Unity of Command versus one process owner.**
- **CLB's priorities are focused on a few supported units as opposed to all supported units within their Area of Operations. The DS CLB for AO West was only delivering to supported Units under Regimental Combat Team 1. All other supported units had to pick their gear up from the DLC causing gear to languish.**
- **DLC was not organized correctly and gear could not be located. Secondary reparables (SECREPs) would sit on the lot as opposed to being backhauled to the Reparable Issue Point aboard Al Taqqadum.**
- **Once the DLC was subsumed by Detachment B, the lot was cleared and re-organized within days. The CWT for units aboard Al Asad quickly dropped by 12 days.**
- **DLC operating in Al Fallujah/Baharia was made up entirely of Reserve Component Marines who received limited training before deploying ISO OIF 8.2. While the MMDC aggressively sought ways to improve the overall level of DLCs through recommended actions they were only recommendations and could be ignored. It would have been beneficial to rotate personnel to the different sites. MAGTF Materiel Distribution Center did not have the flexibility to move personnel around to leverage expertise where needed.**

Monthly Assist Visits to DLCs

- **The DLC's at Al Asad, Camp Al Fallujah/Baharia, Ar Ramadi and Camp Arifjan are very important to distribution process and need to be frequently visited to address any training, process, or IT concerns.**

- **Conduct monthly site visits in order to address any issues or concerns and see how the Marines are doing. These monthly visits are essential for the assessment of information technology assets, distribution processes, throughput of cargo and training.**

Personal Effects, Roll Back/Retrograde & DRMO

- **Units ship cargo/gear through DLC's and finally through the MMDC at Camp Al Taqaddum for personal effects, rollback/retrograde, and DRMO without filling out the proper paperwork or following proper guidelines. The burden of custody and paperwork is then put on the MMDC or the cargo is shipped back to the using unit.**

- **When doing a turn over all units should be informed of the proper procedures by the DLCs or MMDC. Each DLC needs to be cognizant of their duties as owners of a portion of the distribution process and if cargo does not meet the criteria or does not include proper documentation it should not be accepted by the DLC and it should be returned to the shipper.**

31XX Occupational Field Training/Proficiency

- **31XX Occupational Field encompasses a broad range of distribution responsibilities divided into three distinct functional skill sets; Freight Operations, Passenger Travel, and Personal Property. The primary function of the 31XX occupational field was the distribution of strategic and operational sustainment cargo or freight operations. 31XX Marines are assigned to SMU MMDC while in the rear and are primarily responsible for the distribution of SMU supplies which is only one aspect of freight operations and does not adequately prepare 31XX Marines to perform Defense Transportation System/Theater Channel Airlift System shipping distribution functions while deployed.**

- **In order for 31XX Marines to be thoroughly proficient in theater sustainment receiving, shipping, and distribution functions it is critical that 31XX's perform these functions in garrison. Sustained training in shipping cargo via DTS and a thorough knowledge of associated Automated Information Systems (AIS) are required to support the freight shipping process. This can only be achieved through 31XX employment in garrison base and station freight operations. Therefore, MLG 31XX Marines should be integrated with Base/Station Freight Operations Sections while in garrison which will serve as a training platform and will enable 31XX Marines to be proficient in a deployed environment.**

Data Transfer during River City Conditions

- Firewalls were established to block message traffic during River City condition blocked data transfer between the MMDC's Automated Manifest System Tactical (AMS-TAC) write station computers to the National Radio Frequency In-Transit-Visibility (RF-ITV) server. Without this data transfer the MMDC can not properly load Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags. This affects the ability of the consignor and consignee to properly track gear from source to destination. In order to solve this problem the MMDC submitted a River City request form to the Marine Logistics Group's G-6 section. This request listed all of the internet protocol (IP) addresses of the individual write stations and the IP address of the national RF-ITV server. This ensured continuous data transfer between write stations and the RF-ITV server. There are over 20 write station computers aboard Camp Al Taqaddum, and new stations are frequently added or deleted which translates into the River City request must constantly be updated.

- Recommend unrestricted access to the national RF-ITV server to all users aboard Camp Al Taqaddum. This will allow the MMDC to properly operate during River City conditions and let the using units aboard base access to the national RF-ITV website. Without this change information sent to the RF-ITV server is delayed after the River City conditions are over. This causes "late write" tags meaning using units can't see gear moving to follow-on locations.

Automated Manifest System Tactical (AMS-TAC) Field Representative

- **The MMDC had many problems with AMS-TAC network communications and transferring files to RF-ITV Server due to the restricted bandwidth across MNF-W. Theater wide bandwidth restrictions affected Al Taqaddum, Al Asad, Ar Ramadi and Baharia more severely than some other areas. Marines train on how to be proficient users of the program however they can not trouble shoot or fix the IT network.**

- **Bring in a General Dynamics IT (GDIT) technician for help in trouble shooting AMS stations. If personnel from GDIT were on site to work with the S6/G6 then the connectivity problems could be resolved, which would resolve the late tag issue.**

Questions